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Government Transport-land Use Planning and Development 
by Implicit Contract for Franchised Buses and Ferries in 
Hong Kong: 1933 to 1972 
 
Text: 10361 words 
 
Abstract [Rewritten, per Editor Point 2; Referee 2 Point 4] 
 
As a contribution to policy research on monopolies in planning for public utilities and the role of 
the state in ordering the coordination of land use and transport in a market economy, this paper 
evaluates a couple of hypotheses informed by the Coasian economic concept of an implicit 
contract. This states that there have been public subsidies to franchised bus and ferry companies 
in Colonial Hong Kong in the form of concessions in land premiums and discusses its spatial 
land use-transport implications.  The hypotheses were evaluated by a comprehensive archive 
survey and documentary analysis of the clauses in relevant franchise documents, Crown Leases, 
government memoranda, and expert writings on buses and ferries.  The findings revealed that 
there was no real land price subsidy provided for within or outside the franchise or lease 
documents, but there were substantial indirect subsidies during the study period.  These were 
provided not only in terms of the free provision of bus terminals and piers, but also their planned 
combination on government land, as well as the strategic positioning of bus terminals in newly-
developed government housing estates and new towns.  The land use-public transport planning 
strategy shaped the urban structure of Hong Kong prior to the takeover of the companies by 
developers.  The critical role of the government vis-à-vis developers as a super landlord was 
discussed. 
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Keywords: Implicit contract, franchised monopoly, bus terminal, ferry, developer   [Revised, 
per Referee 2 Point 5] 
Preamble  [Added, per Editor Point 2; Referee 2 Points 4 & 7] 
In order to formulate better policies for public transport, researchers have sought to review the 
history of regulations.  Good examples are the works of Coase (1974), Hey (2004) and Mulley 
(1983, 1998).  This paper is, in a sense, in the same genre as these studies, but has a specific 
theoretical focus on economics and planning. 
   The original purpose of this paper was to investigate if there was any implicit pecuniary 
consideration that was outside the remit of written franchise licences by the state for franchised 
buses and ferries it regulated.  The motivation for this investigation stemmed from such practical 
planning issues as the proper regulation of public utilities that are legally protected, the 
privatization of government monopolies (proponents of which rely on the findings of constant, if 
not decreasing, returns to scale), the efficient pricing of decreasing costs or natural monopolies 
(Coase 1946), and far more abstract theoretical issues, such as the genesis of government-
protected monopolies in the first place (Coase 1959; Lai and Yu 2002) and the choice of their 
modes of pricing (Lai et al 2008a, 2008b). 
   In the process of searching for pecuniary considerations that did not fall within the terms of the 
franchise agreements, we discovered that the real subsidies were not monetary, but non-
pecuniary and spatial, and that the state had contributed greatly to supporting the franchised 
public utilities through physical planning under a leasehold land system.  The morphology of 
such planning and some implications of this peculiar system of land tenure for the planning of 
public bus and ferry transport systems were discussed. 
Background   [Added, per Editor Point 2; Referee 2 Points 4 & 7] 
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Consider this criticism of the land administration of lease modifications in Land and the Ruling 
Class in Hong Kong: 
Through the workings of the lease modification system, developer conglomerates that 
acquired utility or public service companies have been able to exploit land assets in those 
companies.  Idled utility sites or public bus depots have been converted into lucrative 
residential or commercial properties via using that system.  This brings out the question 
of social justice and efficient use of land, the single most valuable natural resource that 
Hong Kong possesses (Poon 2006: p.111). 
   There has been a growing local public concern in Hong Kong over the takeovers of franchised 
public utilities by consortia controlled by private development oligarchs and the conversion of 
government land allocated many years ago to these public utilities on leases for depot and plant 
use into private office, commercial, and residential developments.  It has been suspected that 
such takeovers were just a means to obtain cheap land for quick profit via real estate 
redevelopment rather than being socially beneficial long term investments in public utilities.  
Regarding franchised public bus transport, which is Hong Kong’s dominant mode of domestic 
public transportation (by 2009, franchised buses still claimed 33% of all internal transport trips, 
whereas heavy railways captured an equal percentage), Kowloon Motor Bus (KMB); New World 
First Bus (NWFB) and its predecessor, the China Motor Bus (CMB), which lost its franchised 
routes on 1 September 1998; and CityBus (CB) are all owned either by developers or have a 
strategic partnership with a developer.  The same applies to the public ferries – Star Ferry (SF) 
and New World First Ferry – of which the latter took over the bulk of the passenger fleet from 
Hong Kong Ferry (originally called Hong Kong & Yaumati Ferry (HYF)) in 1998. 
   Critics considered the control of franchised public utilities by developers to be not only 
harmful to the proper operation of these utilities, but also unfair to the public, as the land assets 
involved were obtained at a low cost.  Public suspicion of the oligarchic structure of the 
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developers fuelled occasional protests against the monopolistic control of the land and transport 
markets, as well as “collusion” between the government and big business. 
   The looming criticism of developers in relation to the use of the land assets of bus operators 
should not be viewed in isolation, but interpreted from a public policy development point of view 
in the wider constitutional context of post-colonial Hong Kong, now witnessing “rising public 
mistrust of the government and intensifying grassroots grievances” (Lau and Kuan 2000: p.1024).  
It is hoped that our project will provide the public and policymakers with a better-informed 
picture of a key dimension of everyday life in Hong Kong – bus transportation – as well as its 
real estate implications. 
   Interestingly, there has never been any suggestion by critics that the bus franchises, which have, 
since 1933, always been granted on a geographical, or bundled, route basis to private firms, be 
nationalized or replaced by a public corporation, as in the case of London Transport in the past, 
or “liberalized” into an unprotected competitive market with a lot more operators, as in the case 
of Britain today.  They simply want them to keep fares low and run more and newer buses on all 
the routes allocated.  However, they also keep an eye on how the land holdings of public utilities 
are transformed into real estate developments, a process which has apparently also happened to 
British bus garages.(1)
  
Besides, there is a body of international literature that generally praises 
the Hong Kong economy as a successful case of a laissez faire system – a characterization that 
was seriously disputed by Poon (2006) and questioned by the late Milton Friedman (2006) 
shortly before he passed away – and that its bus market is among the most open in the world 
(Hibbs 1985, 1986).  In addition, overseas observers (for instance, Rowlands 2009) generally 
found the local bus industry to be admirably profitable without the need for direct government 
subsidies and excellent in terms of service quality.  The same could have been said about the two 
franchised ferries up until the opening of the first tunnel across Victoria Harbour in 1972. 
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   The rest of the paper is organised into 6 sections. The transport and planning research issues 
and context are discussed, followed by a general exposition of the general hypothesis and 
approach to the subject matter.  Then, a statement of the specific hypotheses to evaluate and of 
the methodology and data used is made.  Next, the history of franchised bus and ferry operations 
in Hong Kong is reconstructed prior to a presentation of the findings for the specific hypotheses 
and their interpretation.  The conclusion recapitulates on the nature and contribution of this paper.     
The Research Issues and Context  [Added, per Editor Point 2; Referee 2 Points 4 & 7] 
The question is: was there any real government concession in land cost beyond the terms of the 
franchise agreements and, if yes, what actually was the concession?  This question pertains to a 
basic area of public policy and theoretical concern, namely legally created or franchised 
monopolies. These involve such policy issues as the proper regulation of public utilities that are 
legally protected, privatization (proponents of which rely on the findings of constant returns to 
scale), efficient pricing for decreasing costs or natural monopolies (Coase 1946), and theoretical 
issues like the genesis of government-protected monopolies in the first place (Coase 1959; Lai 
and Yu 2002) and their efficient pricing (Lai et al 2008a, 2008b). 
   The theoretical issue that this paper engages in is the notion of implicit consideration, which is 
derived from the theory of an implicit contract first developed in labour economics to explain 
why employers do not reduce wages when there is a slump.  Neo-institutional economists have 
found “implicit institutions” and “implicit relation contracts,” or “implicit contracts,” to be 
significant phenomena in economic life (see, for instance, Kasper and Streit 2001: pp. 99-100, 
207).  While these institutions and contracts are generally conceived within organizations, it is 
possible to expand their concept to cover relationships between contracting parties, as in the case 
of labour economics or franchise agreements, which is a subject matter of this project.  The 
benefits of such contracts are not legally enforceable, as there is no explicit oral or written rule 
stating that they must be, but they are experienced by parties to a contract to the extent that if 
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such benefits are discontinued, then a party may seriously reconsider its intentions to renew any 
contract.  The idea of an implicit contract has been adopted by public economists to deal with the 
practical issue of compensating regulated utility companies for sunken investment costs lost 
when the government opens up a market.  It has been argued that under these circumstances, an 
implicit contract exists in that compensation is warranted (Boyd 1998).  This paper seeks to 
transfer this application to public bus and ferry franchising under the terminology of implicit 
consideration. (2)   
   The concept of implicit consideration advanced here can be considered “Coasian” in the sense 
that it is a means of reducing transaction costs to better achieve the terms of an existing contract, 
or the explicit franchise agreement.  The Hong Kong Government enforces the bus franchises in 
favour of the franchisees, while it prosecutes the operators of unauthorized private bus services 
and other types of authorized bus service that pick up or drop off passengers in franchised bus 
parking zones.  What implicit benefits besides such explicit contractual protections were 
provided by government?(3)   Prior to examining this factual question, there is a need to elaborate 
on the relevant research on transport and land use planning to better position this paper.  
   Economic research on public transport, notably bus franchising, has accumulated a rich corpus 
of knowledge on the question of economies of scale with a view to evaluating the efficiency 
implications of regulating or de-regulating public bus and equivalent services (Hibbs 2003, 
2007); and on the question of the economic nature of franchising.  Interestingly, these two 
intimately-related questions are seldom jointly treated. 
 
   As regards the first question, instances of constant returns to scale, not to mention 
diseconomies of scale, are generally held as grounds for supporting the privatisation of state 
transport monopolies.  A classic example is the case of UK bus operators in the 1920’s, which 
were found to have enjoyed no more than constant returns (Mulley, 1983, p. 8).  Scale economies 
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are basically an empirical question.  Constant returns to scale was the finding in the studies by 
Koshla (1972) and Lee & Steedman (1970).  Diseconomies of scale can be found in the studies 
by Wable & Cole (1975), Koenker (1977), Obeng (1985), and Filippini & Prioni (2003).  
Moreover, good examples of diseconomies can be found in the studies by Williams (1979), 
Viton (1981), and Berechman (1983). 
 
  As regards the second question, the focus has been on the evolution of the grounds for and 
structures of franchises as well as the means of granting or capturing such franchises in the past. 
A well-known recent development informed by property rights economic reasoning is to 
conceive of the state as a monopoly of “curb (kerb) rights” (Klein et al., 1997), which kindles the 
need for a neo-institutional economic model of bus and ferry franchises.  The common ground of 
various lines of research is that the state is allocating a bundle of legally protected rights and/or 
economic concessions via the franchise agreement to public bus or ferry operators in return for 
some fiscal revenue as well as whatever social considerations may be seen to be in line with 
prevailing public policy.  This way of abstraction has two salient features.  First, the 
generalization is one of pure exchange because the role of the state is merely as an auctioneer of 
monopoly rights.  It is not conceived as being involved in any planning or coordinated 
production activities.  Second, the model is a-spatial as land use is not factored into it. 
 
  This paper is a pioneering attempt to evaluate the second theoretical question using Hong Kong 
historical data and experts (operators and officials) in the field to examine the potentially active 
involvement of the state in investment decisions (i.e. makes forward looking and innovative 
decisions under uncertainty) as well as in activities with a land use planning and development 
dimension.  Though not being expressly promised entitlements, these state endeavours can be 
understood as ingredients of an implicit contract that forms part and parcel of the formal public 
transport franchise. 
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  In this connection, it is worth noting that while there have been few planning articles 
specifically dedicated to bus transport since the 1950s and 1960s (Green, 1952; Dickinson, 1961) 
except Bell & Cloke (1991) and Martin et al. (2008), the role of buses in land use planning 
policies and research has not waned, as can be seen from the chain of work by Smeed (1964), 
Proudlove (1968), Banister (1994), Sim et al. (2001), Bunker & Searle (2007), Jenks & Dempsey 
(2007), Ji & Gao (2010).  Research on ferries has recently gathered momentum in planning, as 
exemplified by the articles of Gitlesen & Thorsen (2000) and Pooley et al. (2006).  However, 
research on the role of land use planning in supporting the actual operations of franchised buses 
and ferries as part of a covert state undertaking is rare.  This is interesting, as the relationship 
between land use and transport is cardinal in planning policy formulation.  The landmark works 
of Buchanan (1956) and the famous “Buchanan Report” Traffic in Towns (Buchanan & Crowther, 
1964) remain standard references for subsequent reviews, such as those by Batley (1996), 
Pharoah (1996), and Ward (2007).  Yet Buchanan’s emphasis between land use and transport has 
not stimulated examination of how district or even site level planning of bus depots and 
terminals could influence bus operations. 
 
  The concept of implicit contract was first developed in labour economics to explain why 
employers do not reduce wages when there is a slump. It has been subsequently adopted by 
public economists to deal with the practical issue of compensating regulated utility companies 
for sunken investment costs lost when the market is opened by government. It is argued that in 
the circumstances there is an implicit contract or “implicit compact”, such that compensation is 
warranted (Boyd 1998). 
 
The Hypothesis General Hypothesis and Approach   
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Applying the concept of an implicit contract to regulated transport operators, it could also be 
argued that the state has always been doing something implicit in favour of any franchised 
monopoly since its genesis, as in the case of the employer tacitly undertaking not to reduce the 
employee's wage in less profitable times. In this paper, we seek to examine if there is any similar 
implicit help given by government infrastructural planning and development directly related to 
the operation of privately run ferries and buses.  Granted that UK bus operators in the 1920’s 
enjoyed no more than constant returns (Mulley, 1983, p. 8) if not decreasing returns to scale 
ceteris paribus, nonetheless such an implicit contract should help create a decreasing cost 
environment for the franchisees who, in a quid pro quo, would be capable of practising efficient 
multiple pricing (Coase, 1946). This would also serve a social transfer objective as an alternative 
to nationalisation or other forms of controlling a public utility for efficiency or equity reasons. 
  The foregoing consideration of argument was evaluated by a case study of the provision of 
public bus and ferry services in colonial Hong Kong up to the opening up of the first harbour 
tunnel in August 1972.  This event opened a new chapter in public transport for the British 
colony in terms of technology and economics as well as in governance. The opening up of the 
harbour tunnel (amazingly without a rail line) saw the beginning of the initially slow demise of 
the ferries and coincided with the end of the de facto geographical monopoly of the two 
franchised bus companies. Public buses and ferries ceased to be purely complimentary goods and 
started competing with, and at the same time serving as feeders for each other.  This case study 
of franchised buses has to be tied-in with franchised ferries – because together they were a single 
public solution to the problem posed by the natural barrier of the bridgeless, but strategically 
vital Victoria Harbour. 
  An important idiosyncratic institutional feature of this case study is that the Hong Kong 
Government had no local government and [Referee 1 Point 2] Government was the landlord of 
all land (and water) and, given its constitutional status, had an absolute say in land and planning 
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matters not easily found on other jurisdictions.  However, the analysis should not therefore be 
regarded as no more than an Aristotelian accident. That is not least because public investment in 
transport infrastructure can hardly be justified as being theoretically separable from public 
transport franchising.  In addition, there is the need to jointly consider that land use and 
transportation in transport theory had intellectual roots in the work of Sir Patrick Abercrombie 
(Abercrombie, 1933), which predates the classic “Buchanan Report” (Buchanan & Crowther, 
1964).  The former has now been receiving renewed interest under the auspices of ‘sustainable 
development’ (Haywood, 2005). 
  Furthermore, this inquiry should contribute to the better re-interpretation of the source of the 
most important version of the Coase Theorem, “The Federal Communications Commission” 
written by Nobel laureate Ronald Coase (1959). This version, formulated by Cheung (1992) can 
be stated as “the delineation of property rights is the prelude to market transactions.”  In this less 
well known work, Coase examined the US Navy fostered genesis of American regulation of the 
use of radio frequencies.  This case of invisible overcrowding is directly comparable to visible 
traffic congestion on highways as a good example of an externality in which there is no 
particular culprit as every user is a source of the problem of interference and jamming.  Coase 
argued that auctioning radio frequency bands to the highest bidder is a better solution than 
discretionary non-price allocation by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).  Had 
Coase examined the ways in which bus and ferry franchises in 1950s Hong Kong were dealt with, 
and related these to his historical study of the lighthouse in 1974 (Lai, Davies and Lorne, 2008a, 
2008b), we would have seen a much better argued Coase Theorem.  In any event, the Coase 
Theorem is a pure exchange model that does not accommodate production or investment. 
  In our case study, the history of Hong Kong public bus and ferry regulation is reconstructed 
with the focus on the periods of franchises; the nature of key express contractual arrangements; 
and the government efforts in providing land for ferry piers in tandem with bus termini as well as 
 11
for operator yards and depots.  These infrastructural facilities are hypothesised to be the main 
implicit contract consideration provided by the government. 
  This Hong Kong study should be interpreted in the light of the findings that the franchised 
ferries and buses did complement each other in terms of turnovers and enjoyed positive returns to 
scale in the period. 
  Why is Hong Kong so interesting for transport research?  The reasons are many, but the prime 
consideration is that while its bus and ferry fleets are among the largest in the world, they have 
always been able to operate as private concerns without direct public subsidies, and yet they are 
franchises that have to pay the government royalties and/or taxes.  Hibbs (1985) also found that 
Hong Kong’s bus industry was highly open on a comparative basis.  While ferries were mainly 
locally built, as Hong Kong was one of the best ports of the British Empire, most buses were 
imported from the UK and run on highways following traffic regulations modelled after British 
laws.  This means that Hong Kong is an ideal case for a debate over libertarian transport policies.   
The Hypotheses, Methodology, and Data [Methodology added, per Editor Point 2 and 
Referee 2 Point 8] 
   To find out whether or not there have been public subsidies to franchised bus and ferries 
companies in Colonial Hong Kong in the form of land premium concessions during the period 
January 1933 to August 1972, we formulated two hypotheses to inform our evaluation: 
Hypothesis 1: The conditions of the franchises of KMB, CMB, SF, and HYF from 1933 
onwards did guarantee government concessions regarding their land acquisitions for 
garages, depots, shipyards, and workshops. 
Hypothesis 2: The Crown (Government) Leases (or other title documents) for KMB and 
CMB’s garages, depots, and workshops and SF and HYF’s shipyards were obtained by 
way of private treaties rather than by auction or tender. 
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   The start year was the first time public buses were regulated by government franchise, while 
the end time marked the opening the of the first tunnel across Victoria Harbour – an event that 
fundamentally transformed the relationship between the bus and ferry from a complementary 
into a  competitive one as “tunnel bus” routes were introduced. 
   The methodology for evaluating Hypotheses 1 and 2 was a comprehensive archived survey of 
three major categories of relevant public information: franchise conditions, government 
memoranda, and Crown Leases relating to the land assets of bus and ferry companies.  
Photocopies of the first two categories of documents were obtained from the Public Record 
Office (PRO), while those for the third were purchased from the Lands Registry. 
   The first step in the data mining and interpretation process was to obtain the franchise 
documents from the PRO.  To do so, there is a need to identify the number and years of each 
franchise grant and renewal.  This was taken after a careful reading of the following sources of 
public information: the government’s annual reports, the annual reports of each franchisee, and 
specialist books on the bus and ferry companies by expert authors, notably Chan (1999), Davis 
(1994, 1995 ) and Johnson (1998 ). 
   The second step was to identify the locations of the land assets of the franchisees devoted to 
construction, maintenance, and repairs of buses and ferries.  This was taken after a careful 
reading of the same sources of public information mentioned in step one above. 
   The third step was to obtain the land documents for these assets from the Land Registry pr the 
PRO.  These documents could be Crown Leases, under which land parcels were directly obtained 
from the Crown or Assignments, from which they were purchased from other individuals. 
   The third step involved the identification of the lot numbers of the land parcels according to the 
Lot Index Plans maintained by and deposited in the Lands Department for public inspection.  
Where the land parcels used as depots or yards have not been redeveloped, the Crown Leases or 
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assignments could be purchased from the Land Registry.  Where the sites have been redeveloped 
and, hence, resulted in the execution of new lot numbers and Conditions of Exchange (which 
were deemed to be Crown Leases when all positive covenants were fulfilled under the 
Conveyancing and Property Ordinance) then the old Crown Leases and Assignments had to be 
obtained from the PRO, which keeps all superseded Crown Leases and Assignments. 
  The last step was lease interpretation.  Hypothesis 1 would be refuted if: (a) there is no 
government promise of any type of concession in the land supply for depots and yards in terms 
of location, time, or premium and/or (b) there are, in fact, burdens imposed on the franchisees in 
order to obtain land for bus terminals, ferry piers, depots, and yards. 
   Hypothesis 2 can be easily verified by reading the applicable Crown Leases to see if they were 
obtained by way of private treaty grants (PTGs), auctions, or tenders.  Land parcels obtained by 
PTGs under Hong Kong’s land administrative system always attract concessionary, if not token, 
premiums, especially if there is no open competition in the market.  If such land parcels were 
obtained from the government using any method other than a PTG, Hypothesis 2 would be 
refuted.  In case land parcels are obtained second hand by way of assignment, this hypothesis 
would also be refuted. 
   Hypothesis 1 is not refuted if there were government guarantees for the provision of cheap land, 
which would be a pecuniary benefit for the franchisees. In that case, there would be factual 
support for the criticism that developers that control the public utilities unfairly converted such 
land for other uses. 
   If Hypothesis 1 is refuted, then the idea of an implicit pecuniary benefit would be out of the 
question if Hypothesis 2 is also refuted.  (The land administrative system of Hong Kong’s 
leasehold system sells land at market prices through open auctions or tenders and at a concession 
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by way of private treaty.)  However, this would not rule out any non-pecuniary benefit, the 
existence of which is a matter of speculation. 
   Prior to presenting the findings for the specific hypotheses, produced below is the history of 
government franchising of bus and ferries reconstructed according to our documentary study.  
The State in the Formation and Regulation of Transport Monopolies in Hong Kong 
Narratives of Hong Kong public transportation typically (as can be found in such research 
endeavours of transport students and officials as Chow (2006), Wong (1995), Pang (2001), Su 
(2001), and Wong (2001)) commence with the year 1933 when government franchises were 
granted to the China Motor Bus Company Limited (CMB) and Kowloon Motor Bus Company 
Limited (KMB) to complete a process of regulating public passenger conveyances that had 
begun with the control of ferries, namely the “Star” Ferry and those run by the Hong Kong and 
Yaumatei Ferry Company Limited (HYF).  Academic research on public transport in Hong Kong 
approached the question of transport policy from an administrative, or a user, angle (Barden, 
1986; Barden & Runnacles, 1986; Hills ,1984; Cullinane, 2003; Lau & Chiu, 2004; and Lam et 
al., 2005) and rarely dealt with specific transport planning infrastructure or land supply. 
 
  The former two companies obtained a geographical monopoly of running public buses, 
respectively, on Hong Kong Island and on the mainland (Kowloon and the New Territories). 
“Star” Ferry got an exclusive right to use a pier at Central and another at Tsimshatsui in 1912, 
whereas HYF obtained exclusive rights to operate passenger ferry services linking other 
designated spots in the Harbour in 1923 initially on 3 routes and later also a vehicular-passenger 
service in 1928, which commenced operation in 1933. 
 
  The history of franchising public bus transport in Hong Kong, particularly the relationship 
between what happened in the colony and in the United Kingdom under the London Traffic Act, 
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1924; Road Traffic Act, 1924 and the London Passenger Transport Act, 1933, is an under-
researched area.  While the formative years of bus franchises in Hong Kong happened to be the 
same as those for London buses (Hibbs, 1972), there is no evidence that the Hong Kong model 
aimed at protecting the interests of franchised trams as researchers have identified for UK 
(Mulley, 1983).  Indeed in 1919 the Government had turned down an application made in 1913 
for duplicating on the Kowloon side of the harbour the existing tram service along the Hong 
Kong Island shoreline (Leeds, 1986, p. 29).  Furthermore, an analysis of franchised buses in 
Hong Kong would be defective if it was divorced from the franchised ferries (and any 
substitutes), and vice versa, due to the geographic nature of urban Hong Kong since 1860 as one 
separated by the natural barrier of Victoria Harbour. 
 
Buses 
According to the historical survey of Leeds (1986, p. 24), a Commissioner for Transport, the 
earliest record of regulating buses in Hong Kong can be traced to 1921 when an amendment was 
made to The Vehicles and Traffic Regulation Ordinance “with the intention that exclusive rights 
for running a motor bus service in Kowloon and New Kowloon would be granted in the near 
future.”  It was said by the Attorney General, speaking in the Legislative Council, that “A 
monopoly for a term of years is thought best for two reasons. In the first place, it will enable the 
Government, by control of vehicles, and fares and other things, to secure a better service, 
generally, for the public. It will also enable the Government to secure that there shall be a service 
to certain outlying districts, from time to time, which would probably would not be served under 
a system of free competition.”  Prior to 1933, the bus operators on Hong Kong island included 
the Hong Kong and Shanghai Hotels Limited; Hongkong Tramways Limited (operation 
commencing in 1927, buses sold to CMB in 1933); and the Aberdeen ‘Kaifong’ Association 
(Davis, 1994, p. 4; Leeds, 1986, p. 23).  Those across Victoria Harbour on the Kowloon side 
included the KMB (founded in 1921 with 9 lorry buses), Kai Tack Motor Bus Company 
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(founded in 1923 and brought by Hong Kong Tramways Co. in 1928), CMB (commencing 1924), 
Nam Hing Bus Company (service between Yuen Long and Sheung Shui from 1922 till 1933), 
Cheung Mei Bus Company, Chun Hing Bus & Co. and Hong Kong and Cowloon Taxicab Co. 
(Davis, 1995, p. 2-11; Leeds, 1986, p. 23).  Tenders were called for by Government in 
September 1932 and monopoly rights were awarded to CMB and KMB to operate respectively 
on Hong Kong Island and the rest of Hong Kong. 
 
  Our study period covers 4 franchise periods.  From licences discovered in the Public Records 
Office, the first franchise cycle for both bus companies ran for 15 years from 11 June 1933 under 
The Vehicles and Traffic Regulation Ordinance 1912 (the 1912 ordinance).  This was interrupted 
by the Battle of Hong Kong and Japanese occupation from 8 December 1941 to 15 August 1945.  
The second period ran from 15 February 1947 under another licence that followed the 1912 
ordinance, followed by the third, also under the 1912 ordinance, which was a brief transitional 
period till 13 August 1959.  The fourth started according to licence under the Road Traffic 
Ordinance 1957 on 14 August 1959 to end 15 years later in 1974.  In September 1969, the 
Government officially regularised the status of minibuses which, in violation of the franchises, 
had been illegally competing with the franchised buses.  As a quid pro quo, the Government paid 
compensation to the two franchised companies: HK$5.2 million to KMB and HK$4.3 million to 
CMB and structured a “financial package” which permitted their profit to be 15% of net fixed 
assets with a great reduction in royalties from 20% to 15% of gross receipts and finally, in 
1970/1971, to zero. 
 
Ferries 
As regards ferries, our study period covers two regulatory cycles for the “Star Ferry” and three 
for HYF.  As regards the “Star Ferry”, the first period started in 1933 and ended in 1948 after a 
period of 15 years.  The second commenced in 1949 and lasted 30 years to end on 31 January 
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1979 (Johnson, 1998, p. 98).  As regards HYF, the first one started in 1933 and ended in 30 June 
1948 (Leeds, 1986); the second, as shown on a licence found in the Public Records Office, lasted 
from 1 July 1948 for 15 years under The Ferries Ordinance 1917; and the third went beyond our 
study period and ended in 1979 . 
 
   The history of the public ferries in Hong Kong could be traced back to 1880 and the first 
regular harbour crossing ferry service (4) The “Star” Ferry Company took the service over when 
the company was formed in 1898.  The only specialist study on regulation of ferries in Hong 
Kong by Leeds (1986) traced the history of control back to 1893.  “By 1893 there were 61 steam 
launches licensed to carry passengers plus 53 private launches, [and] Government regulation of 
the ferry services was minimal except through the conditions relating to the lease of piers.” 
(Leeds, 1986, p. 14 Italics authors) We have reasons to believe that the colonial inception of 
ferry regulation could have happened much earlier.  Johnson (1998) referred to the introduction 
of new vessels in 1900-01, “In the meantime the wrangle with government over passenger 
licences was settled…”  In short, there was obviously a regulatory layer covering the standards 
required for vessels to be licensed to carry passengers for a fare. Johnson mentioned further (p.34) 
“survey and safety rules” being tightened in 1891/92. Johnson and noted (p.42), [Referee 1 
Point 3] anent ordering a third double-ender in 1898, “When the rules for licensing passenger-
carrying vessels were written…” without specifying clearly when that had been. (5) Apart from 
the “Star” Ferry, empowered in 1902 by the “Star” Ferry Company Ordinance to make by-laws 
to regulate its service, it was not until 1917 with the enactment of the Ferries Ordinance that the 
cross harbour services were brought under full and specific government regulatory control.  This 
Ordinance prescribed that ferries operating in specified areas had to be licensed by the Governor-
in-Council and provided powers of licensing and regulating ferries as well as for prescribing fees 
or any premium payable for a licence. 
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“In 1916, there were 16 ferry companies providing ferry services between two shores of 
the Harbour. Competition was very keen. Touting for passengers always resulted in 
serious fightings (sic)” (Kwan, 1999, p. 21). 
 
   In 1918, tenders were invited by Government for ferry services between Hong Kong Island and 
three districts on west Kowloon, i.e., Yau Ma Tei, Mong Kok and Shamshuipo (to the north of 
Tsimshatsui, which had been and remained the monopoly of the “Star” Ferry due to the land 
holdings by Wharf at that strategic location: across the Harbour narrows).  The Four Districts 
Kaifong Company captured the 5-year rights to these services.  In 1923, these rights fell into the 
hands of the newly created Hongkong and Yaumatei Ferry Company (HKF) which started 
operation with 11 ferry boats.  New ferries routes were opened, by the HKF between Kowloon 
City, Hung Hom and Shau Kei Wan in 1928 (Chiu, 1973, p. 45). 
 
Harbour Bridge, Ferries, and Buses 
However, the true story of the planning for Hong Kong franchised bus-ferry services must begin 
with the mysterious decision of the Colonial Hong Kong Government to abandon in the idea of a 
harbour bridge, proposed by the Harbour Master in 1902 (Hong Kong Government, 1903). This 
was not a swift decision since the choice of a vehicular ferry link was not proposed by the 
Director of Public Works until 20 October 1926. It was to run between Murray Road (eventually 
Jubilee Street) and Jordan Road (Hong Kong Government, 1928) and was only discontinued 
when the Chek Lap Kok airport railway reclamation was in place just before 1997.(6) In any 
event, the 1924 Report on the Commercial Development of the Port of Hong Kong by the Port 
Engineer recommended a vehicular ferry link. The consulting engineers, Coode, Fitzmaurice, 
Wilson and Mitchell, stated, “We have given consideration to the provision of better facilities for 
traffic between Hong Kong and the mainland, particularly for vehicular traffic. The only feasible 
method without great expenditure of money is the provision of ferry boats…We consider the 
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cross harbour traffic between Hong Kong and Kowloon is growing sufficiently to warrant the 
provision by Government of a good vehicular and passenger ferry service” (Leeds, 1986, p. 31). 
 
   It was this 1926 decision that saved the ferries and shelved the concept of building a road link 
across Victoria Harbour until the 1940s. The decision was then retrieved and concretised in the 
visionary post war Abercrombie Report of 1946 (Lai, 1999), that shaped the geographical and 
functional relationship between public ferries and buses in colonial Hong Kong up to the end of 
July 1972.  Government was slow in implementing the Report. The decision to build a tunnel 
(but minus the proposed rail) was made in 1954.  The Victoria City Development Ltd. (VCD) 
was formed and published a consultant proposal in 1961 (Bristow, 1984).  In 1966, VCD invited 
HYF to invest up to 25% of the venture, then new to the world, but the latter declined to accept – 
a serious commercial mistake that would cost the company a lot, though that matter is outside 
our study period.  In 1969, the Transport Department was formed to coordinate all transport 
matters. 
 
A key question: was franchising a mere predatory tax machine? 
The terms of the franchise licences for KMB, CMB, and HKF found in the Public Records 
Office and the story of the “Star Ferry” by Johnson (1998) make it tempting for the uninformed 
to say that the Government was promoting British interests, as buses had to be of “British 
Empire (later simply British and then British Commonwealth) manufacture”; all ferries had to be 
“British ships” and the majority of the directors of the companies had to be “British subjects”.  
On a close analysis, these terms simply were expedient in ordering affairs as Hong Kong traffic 
laws were modelled on British equivalents and hence British buses would easily fit the local 
traffic regulations.  There was no rule against Hong Kong making her own buses or ferries as 
these would be British by virtue of her status as a British colony.  British subjects include locally 
born Chinese and indeed KMB, CMB and HKY were the businesses of three local Chinese 
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families.  British ships, on the other hand, meant no more than that the ferries would be built in 
Hong Kong by Hong Kong yards and fitted with locally constructed engines of British or local 
design.  The record indicates that this is what happened. 
 
   It was not unreasonable to deduce from the wordings of the pre-war financial reports of Hong 
Kong Government that franchises were merely a form of tax. The pre-war reports mentioned that 
franchised companies paid royalties based on gross receipts but did not disclose the rates of levy 
for any company.  The account in such authoritative works as Hibbs (1985, 1986) notes fares on 
ferries and buses in Hong Kong “had been controlled by the administrators of the government 
and remained unchanged from 1949 to 1970” (p.120).  From Public Records Office archive 
materials, we discovered the actual rates of royalties and other franchise terms for KMB and 
CMB.  There was virtually no government promise of any form of assistance to the operators.  
Some terms could even be regressive as for instance double deckers were generally disallowed 
for CMB.  So, to conclude that Government was a benevolent dictator interested in tapping the 
rent reaped by the franchisees from the monopolies it had created, while also capping their 
charges (i.e., imposing price controls) so that they could not fully exploit their monopoly power 
would not be amiss.  For indeed it is true that the franchised companies and thus Government did 
reap profits, which grew slowly over the pre-war years as percentages of total revenue, as can be 
seen from the figures for three of the involved companies in Table 1. 
 
   After the war, there was an interlude in which the Government, influenced by the new British 
Socialist government’s strongly Keynesian thinking, sought to control profit.  However, finally 
this was not practised and Government observed the royalty terms agreed with the operators.  
These terms varied with operators. For KMB, royalty during the study period was defined as a 
percentage of [Referee 1 point 4] by reference to gross annual receipts which grew to 20% in 
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1959. For CMB, royalty was charged on the basis of gross annual receipts till 1959 when the 
basis of levy became one of net profits. 
 
   Furthermore, one noteworthy feature of the Hong Kong bus market in the 1960s was how 
government was striking a balance between keeping regulated bus fares low and ensuring that 
alternative modes of transit were available, to the detriment of the franchised operators, as best 
demonstrated by the tacit police toleration of “pirates”. whichThese had emerged with 
government permission in 1961 as “dual-purpose vehicles (DPV)” to supplement the services of 
the KMB in the remote areas of the New Territories.  These 9-seater PDV soon went out of their 
supposed village catchments and intruded into urban Kowloon. During the Communist Riots of 
1967/1968, during which normal bus operation was hampered by strikes and sabotage, these 9-
seater pirates also appeared on Hong Kong Island. The concept of DPVs, not to mention the 
outright 1969 regularisation by government of these vehicles and their transformation into 14-
seater “public light buses” (PLB), patently infringed the monopoly rights of KMB and CMB.  
Charging uncontrolled prices which usually far exceeded the regulated bus fares, these PLBs 
paid government a considerable licence fee (approx. US$500 per annum each) and triad societies 
“protection money”. 
 
  But would it be reasonable to suppose that the Government was simply a passive protector of 
British interests, a revenue/profit sharer, a price regulator, or an arbiter of monopolies?  As the 
contractual arrangement was basically either a revenue or profit sharing scheme it follows, even 
though it would be wrong to equate the colonial government with a mere commercial dealer, that 
it would make no economic sense for government not to act positively to enlarge the grantee’s 
income so as to enlarge its own income. Indeed, as the landlord of all lands in Hong Kong, 
transport operations could be regarded as a use of land of the kind government depended on for 
revenue. 
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Government’s Involvement in Planning and Developing Transport Infrastructure 
  From 1933 onwards, a dominant civic design feature of urban Hong Kong was the combination 
of ferry piers with bus termini, with the Jubilee Street-Jordan Road Vehicular ferry route being 
the first transport hub. On the harbour map, one can see the Jubilee Street and Jordan Road pier-
bus terminal as two prominent protrusions into the Harbour.  The Tsimshatsui pier did not have 
the benefit of a vehicular ferry but equally had the advantage of a major bus terminal as well as 
the terminal of the government owned and run Kowloon-Canton Railway (KCR).  It less clear, 
however, how this second complex arose since it was clearly not from a ‘one off’ decision to 
create such a hub of the kind exemplified by the vehicular ferry example. Where the “Star” Ferry 
is concerned the process was more sequential, with the ferry coming first, bus traffic second and 
finally the railway. On the Hong Kong Island side, in contrast, the creation of any sort of public 
transport interchange for the “Star” Ferry had to wait for the pier to be relocated in late 1957.  It 
was said that as early as 1920 the Tsimshatsui pier, located right outside the terminus of the 
newly built KCR, had by 1920 a yard for buses.      
    
  This land use planning design geared towards inter-modal change, which was obviously to 
facilitate cross harbour passenger transport movement, was to be replicated in other areas as the 
city continued to expand along the waterfront on either side of the Harbour.(7) (Table 2)  Good 
infrastructure for modal change must be critical. Indeed, a significant stumbling block for the 
efficiency of transport operation by the 1960s was neither the fleet size of ferries nor the buses 
per se but the interface between them. As Johnson (1998, p. 85) comments, “Now there was a 
new form of congestion...The concourse...couldn’t cope with the number of passengers, 
Ferries...could move in and out of the piers faster than the Kowloon Motor Bus fleet could feed 
passengers in the mornings or take them away at night.” 
 
 23
  Looking at old maps, we established that since the 1960s, bus terminals according to the latest 
highways standards were also planned and built inside all government public housing estates.(8) 
These were located in the study period in the foothills of the Kowloon Range or remote areas on 
the Island and outside major new private developments, such as Mei Foo San Tsuen.(9) (Tables 
3A & 3B).  
 
  After the war, new vehicular ferry piers were added to the Central route and in the 1960s, more 
still to serve the HYF North Point-Kowloon City(10) and North Point-Kwun Tong (commencing 
beyond the study period) lines. 
 
  All ferry piers we found were built on government land and all HYF piers were designed, built, 
and maintained by government. All bus termini were designed, built and maintained by the 
Government for use by franchised operators.  They were used by the franchisees without the 
need of any payment.(11)   Buses were often completely full when they departed their quay side or 
housing estate bases during rush hours and profits were guaranteed.(12) The bus terminals had 
such basic facilities as covered bus-passenger platforms and control rooms for bus inspectors. 
Public toilets could only be found in the tolled area of ferry piers and were not a feature of bus 
terminals during the study period.  Alan Cheung’s photo in Johnson (1998, p. 65) shows that a 
covered waiting platform for public transport access had been available at Star Ferry’s 
Tsimshatsui Pier as of the 1930s. However, most bus termini in Hong Kong had no bus platforms, 
not to mention canopies, till the 1960s.  At the time when the Tsimshatsui bus terminus had got 
its concrete covered bus platforms, the Jordan Road Ferry bus terminus remained very Spartan in 
design (Photo 1), which can be compared with the much better designed North Point Passenger 
Pier and Ngau Tau Kok bus termini (Photo 2). Basic as they were, these were generally 
considered adequate by planning and social standards at the time.  However, bus and ferry 
terminals serve many pivotal purposes in transport operations (Steer 1979), particularly because 
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they allow “traffic recovery time”(13) for the vehicles or vessels so that the latter could better 
keep to their planned schedules.  Besides, bus terminals are easily-guarded locations for the 
overnight parking of buses that could not be accommodated in bus depots.(14)  Although these 
general benefits of bus terminals should be viewed in light of their actual designs (Thrower, 
2009), until the 1980s, the combination of ferry piers and bus terminals worked well for 
operators and passengers. 
 
  Besides piers and terminals, the Government also leased at a premium to HYF(15) and the two 
franchise bus operators’ yards for the construction, maintenance, repair and storage of ferries and 
buses as well as quarters and even schools for staff and dependents. (Table 1)  The locations of 
the depots and yards over the years were identified from an exhaustive search of all available old 
telephone directories, government annual reports, and the lease terms – the last of which was 
accomplished through a search of the title documents at the Land Registry and the Public 
Records Office (in the case of HYF/HKF).(16)  The small fleet of the “Star” Ferry, being a 
member of the Hongkong and Kowloon Wharf & Godown Company, was built and serviced at 
the Hong Kong & Whampoa Dock Company facilities at Hung Hom.   
 
It is an interesting discovery, to the amazement of the authors accustomed to the norm of 
“private treaty grants” of government land to regulated public utilities, that not KMB, CMB, nor 
HKF obtained these yards free. They had purchased them from the government in land auctions 
during the study period when the economy of Hong Kong was still very fragile.  Land for the 
facilities was hardly cheap.  In any event, these depots and staff quarters were to become the 
most valuable company asset for the franchisees as land prices escalated with economic and 
population growth.(17) At the time they were purchased, they served the immediate operational 
and staff needs of transport operators. 
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   An additional key government facility for ferries in sub-tropical Hong Kong often visited by 
typhoons in the summer was the reservation for ferries, at some point in the post-war period, of 
guaranteed mooring spaces in publicly provided typhoon shelters during periods when the No. 8 
signal was in force.(18) Given the crowding in typhoon shelters (and the rental government 
charged for a space), ensuring that sufficient space was always ready for the ferry fleet would 
have been a huge foregone rental by government, since the ferries would have been the largest 
vessels accommodated and, even moored up side by side (as they were) would have taken up a 
lot of space.   
 
  The first depot KMB constructed for buses was begun in 1955 at To Kwa Wan and was 
completed in 1958. Another depot at Lai Chi Kok broke ground in July the same year and was 
planned to be ready for occupation by the middle of 1958. Later in 1961, as services expanded, 
land at Kwun Tong with a total area of approximately 200,000 square feet was purchased by 
KMB with the intention of constructing two multi-storey depots.  By the end of 1965 two three-
storey bus depots had been commissioned while a third was nearing completion.  These depots, 
which accommodated over 1,000 buses, were believed to be the first multi-storey double-decker 
bus depots in the world. 
 
   CMB also began depot construction in January 1957 at North Point, where the Company also 
set up its staff quarters and welfare centre. For garaging of vehicles at night, the stores 
department, machine shops, and component overhaul sections were all located on the upper 
storeys of the building.  At a public auction in the latter part of 1958, CMB acquired a further 
site of 20,000 square feet for garaging its expanding fleet. By 1961, CMB also provided low cost 
housing for some 250 employees and their families and planned additional housing units at its 
new King’s Road Depot.(19)   
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   With regard to the construction of depots by both companies, the government carried out a 
review with public participation to examine the cost effectiveness of the companies’ operations 
including bus depots. It began in April 1981, and was completed in June 1982, though exactly 
what was concluded has not yet been found by research. 
 
   As far as buses were concerned, the availability of depots enabled two technical innovations 
that should be conducive to scale economies.  First, they allowed the import of buses from the 
UK as parts (basically chassis, bus body parts and engines), which could be locally assembled 
and reassembled in various combinations, taking advantage of much lower labour costs in Hong 
Kong.  Second, they allowed major modification to and upgrading of buses in-situ.  
Modifications (especially to the locations of doors and staircase) were required to enable the 
move to “one-man” or “driver-only” operation(20) and upgrading, typically by replacing old 
engines with new and more powerful engines.  The most dramatic example was the CMB’s 
double-decking programme directed by Lyndon Rees commencing 1971 to finish in 1975 (Davis, 
1994, p. 60).(21)    
 
Furthermore, the availability of depots meant that major overhauling, regular cleaning, repair and 
mounting of advertisements (a major source of non-passenger revenue) could be done in house 
under centralised supervision. (22)   
 
  From 1945 to 1972, 672 buses of 12 new models and 1447 buses of 19 models were imported 
new by Hong Kong from the UK for CMB and KMB.(23) As a base for comparison, 35 second 
hand UK buses were exported to Macau in the study period during which not a single bus was 
purchased first-hand.(24)  From 1945 to 1972, the new ferries built by “Star” Ferry and HYF were 
respectively 12 and 63.(25)  This shows the local franchised companies were responsive to growth 
in demand.(26)   
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  At this juncture, it is worth noting that the “Hong Kong Passenger Transport Survey: 
1964/1966” by E. Dalby of the UK Road Research Laboratory (the Dalby Report), as a trip-
origin and traffic management analysis in the tradition of the Buchanan Report, did not 
recommend public investment in such infrastructure as termini and depots but did mention the 
“absence of parking spaces” for buses (Leeds, 1986, p. 52), an observation which surely had a 
bearing on the government reservation of land on town plans and subsequently the actual 
construction of purpose-built bus termini suitable for overnight parking(27) and bus depots in the 
1960s. 
 
  The Hong Kong Shipyard (HKS) owned by HYF at Tai Kok Tsui was the basis for HYF to 
construct most of its modern triple deckers on its own.  In 1968 and 1969 government allowed a 
significant lease deal to HYF/HKS for the building and repair of HYF vessels as well as for the 
building of a multi-storey flatted general industrial building.(28) This valuable “surrender and 
regrant” exercise, executed when the decision to build the Harbour Tunnel was made, was likely 
to enable HYF to operate more efficiently with a stronger base. 
 
  A pure exchange model of franchising cannot accommodate such government efforts as 
locating, designing, building, and maintaining the passenger/vehicular ferry piers and bus 
terminals, and selecting and leasing at nil or nominal rent sites for depots and quarters for use by 
franchisees: all were transfer payments in kind to franchisees. Above all, in the original franchise 
agreements, the bus, and to a different and lesser extent the ferry companies were actually 
expressly required to provide repair plants, buildings and land as government saw fit prior to the 
commencement of the franchises.(29) The provision by government of land is obviously 
something “consideration past” in the law of contract and is in any event not actionable as it is 
not a term of the franchise contract. 
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  However, the main theoretical significance of such payments is that they were allocated and/or 
developed at different time periods and thus should not be regarded as a one-off fixed cost 
expenditure. Instead they should have the benefit of lowering the long run operational costs of 
the operators by removing fixed factors such as limited curb space in old built up areas.  
Furthermore, the non-monetary terms for the bus depots and ship yards were not standard but 
negotiated, suggesting that there was a decision making process. 
 
  Besides, there had to be economies of scale not only because of improved fare collecting 
technologies,(30) but also because franchise operators invested in better passenger carrying 
technologies impossible to achieve without working yards.(31)  This is particularly relevant with 
the “Star” Ferry given the frequency of its services which, by the 1950s, were running at a ferry 
every 2.6 minutes at rush hour. The two franchised bus companies [Referee 1 Point 6] continued 
to import new British bus chassis and bodies of various types mostly in completely knocked 
down (“ckd”) kits and assembled them in their depots.(32) 
 
Findings and Interpretation: the Presence and Nature of Implicit Consideration  
Having thus pictured an informed history of franchised bus and ferry transport, we may now turn 
to the findings to our hypotheses. 
 
Key Findings 
The locations of all identifiable KMC and CMB bus depots and HYF shipyard and the methods 
by which their leases or land titles were obtained are recorded in Table 1. 
 
   We found that there was no sign of land price subsidy provided within or outside the franchise 
or lease documents.  The franchise terms did not mention any government guarantee to supply 
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land, not to mention its provision at concessionary prices.  The government rather imposed many 
burdens for the bus companies, including the purchase of buses of certain standards and the 
satisfactory maintenance of its fleet.  This required KMB and CMB to buy land for the purpose 
of assembling, overhauling, or repairing their buses.   Thus, Hypothesis 1 was refuted. 
 
  We found that all 8 depot sites for KMB and CMB were held under Crown Leases.  From the 
Leases, land premiums were clearly paid for 5 of these and none of the rest showed any “non-
assignment clauses”, which suggests that they were not PTG.   Further search at PRO, the 
conditions of sale which show the land prices paid after public auctions for the other three bus 
depot sites were also found.  A 1958 Colonial Secretariat memo addressed to the District 
Commissioner, New Territories, advised the latter that unlike a utility company facility which 
“must be sited in a particular place”, a bus depot terminus could be sited anywhere and “should 
be sold at auction”.(33) Granted that this was policy as early as 1958, then at most only one CMB 
depot could be obtained by PTG but that possibility was reduced by the absence of any non-
assignment clause typical of land obtained by PTG.  The shipyard for HYF was developed on 
sites acquired by the company via assignments from private individuals for cash considerations 
though, as mentioned in the historical narrative, there was a surrender and exchange exercise in 
1968/1969, which produced a site under one title document.  This means that Hypothesis 2 was 
also refuted. 
 
  Together, these results point towards the credibility of the presence of an implicit consideration 
as a valid research proposition for further investigation, which is reported immediately below.  
However, prior to that, there was a need to record the reason for suspecting the existence of 
government concessions as part of an implicit consideration.  That consideration was twofold. 
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  First with historical hindsight, we can infer a political compensation for the gradual loss of the 
full protection of franchised interests during the study period.  Over the years, the government’s 
safeguards against competition for franchised buses companies, which initially enjoyed near-
exclusive franchises by region, KMB on the Kowloon Peninsula and outlying islands and CMB 
on Hong Kong Island, have been successively attenuated by the legalization of “public light 
buses” (PLBs) and the introduction of franchised maxicabs (“green minibuses”).  The most 
persuasive evidence of the deterioration of a bus company’s full monopoly status is a formal 
shift from a geographical franchise to a route-based franchise. Further analysis, however, is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
  Second and more fundamentally, according to the theory of implicit contracts there was from 
the outset a quid pro quo for government to jointly invest in public transport for the public 
interest.  One important form of implicit consideration recognized by transport planning experts 
such as Runnacles (1998) is the free provision of bus terminals and ferry piers designed and built 
by ferry companies.   These infrastructures were essential not only for the efficient handling of 
passengers, but where bus terminals were concerned, useful as overnight bus storage in case 
depots were full and for traffic recovery purposes.    
 
  Government developed a transport plan piecemeal in response to economic and demographic 
change, only in loose consort with housing development planning. Four stages to this can be 
distinguished. The embryo of subsequent integrated transport plans in the 1930-1946 period.  
 
  The first more systematic planning stage was 1946-59 with the marked growth in termini and 
piers. In this period, a total of 10 ferry piers and 17 bus terminals (8 for CMB and 9 for KMB) 
were built by government throughout Hong Kong. The land use-public transport structure of this 
era is conceptualized in Figure 1. 
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   Then the massive growth in the 1960s where aims at reducing the density of urban 
development took place without ensuring a concomitant coherence of satellite town job/housing 
matches, thus creating increased public transport demand.  The government implemented the 
Abercrombie Report (Lai 1999) in two ways.  First, it situated many high-rise, high-density 
public housing estates by terracing Crown Land at the foothills of the Kowloon Range each with 
a major bus terminus.  Second, the government also started developing the first generation new 
towns (Kwun Tong and Tsuen Wan) with waterfront industries on the mainland side by 
reclamation following certain principles of new town planning in Britain.  “These new towns 
were used as laboratories in the search for satisfactory design relationships between the 
increasing traffic requirements of the day and an appropriate urban form” (Bristow 1989: 22).  
Accordingly, there was a deliberate “routing of the busway through the centre of each 
neighbourhood cell” (Bristow 1989:23), and right from the beginning, ferry terminals were 
constructed together with bus terminals, which were very prolific in Kwun Tong.   The bus 
routes from these terminals linked to all major terminals in other parts of the mainland.  On Hong 
Kong Island, new rental public estates of a smaller scale and intensity were also built with 
similar bus or even ferry terminals (like North Point).  The primacy of the Central, Jordan Road, 
and Tsimshatsui ferry terminals was diluted due to the proliferation of secondary bus terminals in 
the new towns and resettlement housing estates, but the absolute number of passenger trips 
handled by these three magnets grew because for one thing, they were at the heart of Hong 
Kong’s CBD, so white collar workers commuted to their jobs in these areas from elsewhere in 
Hong Kong.  To cross the harbour, they had to ride the ferry. 
 
  Note that this simple land use transport planning strategy of pairing ferry piers with bus 
terminals near major housing and industrial clusters reflected the pragmatism of expatriate 
planners towards the imported notion of “self-containment” or a balance between the blue collar 
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workforce and industrial job supply within a new town.  The idea was to minimize external 
traffic, but the reality, given the laissez faire policy of Hong Kong, was that these new towns 
never became self-contained, as many industrial workers on both sides of Victoria Harbour had 
to cross it to reach their jobs as well.  In an attempt to catch up with ever-rising passenger trip 
demands, both the bus and ferry companies experimented with new models of bigger buses and 
ferries.  The bus companies bought land from the government to build new depots to allow for 
the experimentation to take place.  HYF used its own docks at Tai Kok Tsui to build larger triple 
decker ferries and SF relied on Whampoa to supply and maintain its fleet.  From 1960 to 1969, a 
total of 13 ferry piers and 36 bus terminals (8 for CMB and as many as 25 for KMB) were built 
by government overall Hong Kong. The land use-public transport structure of this era is 
conceptualized in Figure 2.   
 
  Finally the last growth period during which new transport strategies (tunnels, MTR) became 
embedded, initially complementing the final surges of the previous fast-growing demands, only 
finally undermining the basis of the old incrementally developed system in the 80s and later. 
From 1970 to 1972, three more ferry piers and 13 bus terminals (2 for CMB and 11 for KMB) 
were completed by government.  The land use-public transport structure of this era is presented 
in Figure 3.(34)   
 
  Throughout the key element in the state’s ability to adjust and adapt lay in its role as ultimate 
landlord. This ensured government was able to provide implicit consideration to public transport 
franchisees. In its turn that helped government to maintain social harmony in a low labour cost 
economy by keeping transport fares low and providing a relatively multi-modal and efficient 
public transport network. 
 
Conclusion 
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This study in the history and economics of franchised buses and ferries of early post-war colonial 
Hong Kong drew attention to the role played by the government as franchisor-landlord in 
providing essential infrastructural support.  The key infrastructural support we considered 
significant was government planning, granting and development of as many as 83 bus termini 
each being more than 1 ha, 26 ferry piers, and 8 bus depots and 1 shipyard in tandem with new 
town and public housing development  according to the Abercrombie Report.  More than just 
building bus terminals and ferry piers, the government made a great contribution by planning the 
timely combination of bus terminals and piers on government land, as well as strategically 
positioning the bus terminals in newly-developed government housing estates and new towns.  
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Notes 
1. The story of the famous Aldenham Overhaul Work of London Transport, opened in 1956, is a 
case in point.  
2. The term “implicit contract” is not used to refer to specific benefits to avoid entangling the 
analysis, which is qualitative, with high mathematical expositions in the literature for implicit 
contracts.  A contract must have “consideration,” but not vice versa.  
3.  A well-known example of an implicit benefit granted to franchisees is that IN PRACTICE 
(I.E. BY WAY OF INFORMAL CONVENTION) traffic police will not prosecute bus 
drivers when they carry too many passengers, do not park their buses quite within the 
authorized bus parking zones by bus stops, or when their buses emit too much smoke, which 
is a favour that has never been granted to taxis or non-franchised red maxicabs.  
4.  Organised by Dorabjee Nowrojee, which started in 1880 with 4 vessels named Morning Star, 
Evening Star, Rising Star and Guiding Star.  
5. It would be reasonable to suppose that it would have been sometime in the 1860s, possibly as 
a sideshow to the implementation of the British Merchant Shipping Act. There is also the 
matter of the licensing of the drivers (in ferries, coxswains).  We read in Johnson (1998, p. 33) 
that, following an accident in 1891, the coxswain of the Morning Star “lost his certificate for 
six months.”     
6. It is not clear [Referee 1, Point 5] whether this apparently irrational decision was indeed 
forced upon the Government by the dictates of defence strategy that cumulated in the 1936 
Hong Kong Defence Scheme or indeed was simply the result of successful anti-bridging 
lobbying of the ferry operators.  
7. Jubilee Street after the Second World War (HYF ferries to Kowloon (Mongkok) from 18 
November 1964 at the new harbour routes pier; Silvermine Bay-Ping Chau, Cheung Chau 
and Tai O at the new outlying islands pier from 27 August 1966), Wanchai (HYF ferries 
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upon reprovisioning of the new waterfront, ferries to Jordan Road and Hung Hom 
commencing 10 March 1968) and North Point (HYF ferries to Hung Hom and Kowloon City 
commencing 1 September 1963, later also to Kwun Tong) [and, outside the study period, 
later to Sai Wan Ho on the Hong Kong Island side]; Tsuen Wan (HYF ferries commencing 
on 3 July 1958), Tai Kok Tsui (replacing Mongkok pier, HYF ferries to Central commencing 
23 April 1972), Hung Hom (HYF ferries to old Wanchai pier commencing 12 November 
1963 and, outside our study period, “Star” ferries from 1986 from the new pier), Kowloon 
City (HYF ferries to Tonnochy Road, Wanchai waterfront, commencing July 1956), Kwun 
Tong (new pier for HYF ferries to North Point commencing 12 February 1972, to Jubilee 
Street 1 May 1972, to Sai Wan Ho 11 May 1972), [and Sam Ka Tsuen (HYF ferries) to Sai 
Wan Ho commencing 11 May 1972] on the Kowloon side.  See Hong Kong Government 
(various years, 1947-1959; 1960 to 1973); Wah Kiu Yat Po (various years 1948-1973); Ho 
(2004: Table 3.5, pp.172-173)  
8.  Chan (1999); Wah Kiu Yat Po (various years 1948 to 1972); Zheng (2000a, 2000b); 1:600 
Ordnance Survey Maps (inspected at Surveying and Mapping Office, Lands Department, 
Hong Kong)  
9. This estate was built on a former Standard Oil depot, the “Caltex” Oil Depot, before the 
Second World War.  
10. Commencing 27 January 1965, doubled decked on 5 October 1970.  
11. Information confirmed in an Interview with Dr. Dorothy Chan and other government 
planning officials. (P.28)  In para. 2 of memo BL 5/3096/58 from Colonial Secretariat to 
District Commissioner. New Territories, dated 12 April 1958, the Colonial Secretariat stated, 
“Terminus areas are retained as Crown land and not leased to Companies using them. 
Government is responsible for the maintenance of such terminal areas, as regards road 
surfacing etc.”  
12. Bus riders who wanted to catch a bus between terminals had to wait a long time.  If they 
were lucky, they might be able to squeeze onto one and get only a standing place till getting 
off.  
13. The authors are grateful for the advice of Mr. Lyndon Rees on this point.  
14. Information obtained from an Interview with Mr. Lyndon Rees.  
15. Which owned the Hong Kong Shipyard, incorporated in 1948.  
16. In 1950, the Government paid HYF a sum of HK$1.637 million as indemnity for loss of 
vessels requisitioned during the Battle of Hong Kong (Hongkong & Yaumatei Ferry, 1973, 
p.21)  
17. It is an interesting question whether this ‘windfall’ increase in asset value enabled the 
companies to finance ferry/bus expansion and/or replacement on more favourable terms than 
might have been available had they no such assets with which to back the financing required.  
18. The critical point being that to be safe in typhoons the ferries had to be in such shelters (there 
are photographs of what happened to ferries in the 1920s that used the ferry piers for typhoon 
berths). Their freeboard was too low and windage too high to have survived on a mooring in 
the harbour proper.  
19. In addition, at the end of 1975 CMB completed a multi-storey depot at Chai Wan capable of 
accommodating 450 large capacity double-deck buses.  
20. This was a major cost-saving move by eliminating conductors, who issued tickets, etc.   
21. This happened in 1971 CMB, once it obtained a government relaxation of bus height limits 
for hilly routes, started to add an extra deck to each of its relatively new and over-powered 
106 (25 feet 1 inch) Guy Arab Mark V single-deck buses; reducing the length of its 40 
single-deck “Long Dragon” (also of Guy Arab Mark V stock) from 36 feet to 30 feet before 
adding an extra deck.  From an Interview with Mr. Lyndon Rees, we learnt that the cutting 
work was done in CMB’s Chai Wan deport and the re-bodying work at North Point’s Java 
Road workshop.   
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22. During the communist riots in the 1950s and 1960s, some buses not kept inside depots were 
burned out by sabotage and more than 20 Daimler “Jumbo” aluminium-body buses of CMB 
were burned down by arson in the 1970s.  
23.  Davis (1994, pp. 5-7, 225 to 236; 1995, pp.18, 290-295, 298 to 301).  
24.  Davis (1996: p.17).  
25. Hong Kong and Yau Ma Ti Ferry Co. Ltd. (1973); Johnson (1998); Hong Kong Annual 
Reports, Hong Kong Government (various years from 1946 to 1960); Hong Kong 
Government (various years: 1961 to 1972).  
26. It was most unfortunate that the period immediately after the opening of the harbour tunnel 
coincided with the Bus Grant and union activism and “three-day-weeks” in the UK (Davis 
1994:138), which taxed her new bus production capacity, so that both CMB and KMB had to 
rely on second hand buses, such as the Guy Arab IV double deckers and the Leyland Titan 
PD3/4, which were often older than the stock on hand.  
27. Mr. Mike Davis informed the authors that overnight parking of CMB buses at Aldrich Bay 
Street bus station, which could allow kerb side parking, was discontinued by the Transport 
Department. 
28. The detail involved the surrender of 2 pieces of adjoining individual marine lots (Kowloon 
Marine Lots Nos. 42 and 77) acquired by HYF and HKS at Tai Kok Tsui. For this the 
companies were regranted a much larger consolidated industrial site together with three other 
marine lots (78, 79 and 80), including an additional 11,700 sq. feet of land extended 
seawards. These 5 lots remained governed by 5 separate Crown Leases instead of one Crown 
Lease. This favourable practice permitted piecemeal resale or redevelopment no longer 
possible today.  
29. A special condition laid down was that if any company operating a bus service so desired, the 
successful tenderers might be required by the Governor in Council to purchase at such time 
as the Governor in Council may direct, under some method of valuation to be determined by 
the Government, all or any suitable vehicles, repair plant and machinery, lands and buildings 
and materials used by the company for the purpose of undertaking prior to the 1oth June, 
1933 (Passage entitled “Omnibus Services: Confirmation of Local Monopolies for Fifteen 
Years”, of unknown source, as quoted in Davis (1994, p.10))      
30. CMB made the first successful move to a one-man operation as, unlike KMB which retained 
the rear doors of their preferred Daimler models, the Guy buses had doors close to the 
drivers’ cabins. 
31. HYF replaced coal-fired with diesel-powered ferries and began to build a fast, partly air-
conditioned three-storey fleet in the late 1960s. It was also a pioneer in the use of hovercraft 
when services were extended to Tsuen Wan and speed of service became essential to remain 
competitive after the opening up of the Harbour Tunnel. Equally, with such things as double-
ended vessels, with which “Star” Ferry were an early pioneer, double decks, diesel-electric 
drive (as early as 1933), and various ways to improve docking, including guiding spring piles, 
and experiments with berthing parallel to the shore vis-à-vis alongside jetties at right angles 
to the shore. The “Star” Ferry company also constantly innovated to keep pace with steadily 
increasing traffic.  
32. Trial models, however, were fully assembled in UK and often imported in complete units.  In 
the 1978 trial of Metro Cammell Weymann ‘Metrobus’ 9.7MDR buses, UK engineers came 
to Hong Kong to make evaluations for CMB.  
33. Memo BL 5/3096/58 from Colonial Secretariat to District Commissioner. New Territories, 
dated 12 April 1958.   See note 11, ante. 
34. Figures 1 to 3 supplement the land use classification models used by such experts in 
geography as Drakakis-Smith (1979: p.33) by adding in an element of transportation. In 
terms of bus networking, the KMB system was circuitous and can be conceptualised as two 
triangles with their common apex the Jordan Road Ferry bus terminus. The base angles of the 
Deleted: paralysed expansion in 
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urban triangle were Tsuen Wan in the west and Kwun Tong in the east. The other triangle 
had their base angles in rural towns of Yuen Long and Sheung Shui.  The CMB network did 
not have a complete circuit round the island and consisted of a east-west coastal urban axis 
from Shaukiwan to Kennedy Town, punctuated by four major ferry termini (Macau Ferry, 
Central, Wanchai and North Point) which sub-urban routes to the hilly areas on the north and 
the coastal spots on the south of the Island.  Compare this to the a-historical networks 
proposed in Wang and Po (2001: p.267). 
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Table 1: Royalties paid to government by franchised buses and HYF prior to 1941  
 
Financial 
Report  Year 
CMB 
(% government 
revenue) 
KMB 
(% government 
revenue) 
HYF 
(% government 
revenue) 
1934 101,510 
(0.343%) 
128,094 
( 0.433 %) 
90,631 
(0.306%) 
1935 118,275 
( 0.416 %) 
117,505 
( 0.413 %) 
99,782 
( 0.351 %) 
1936 124,088 
( 0.413 %) 
116,613 
(0.388%) 
101,609 
(0.338%) 
1937 128,708 
( 0.388 %) 
140,991 
( 0.425 %) 
126,901 
(0.382%) 
1938 194,703 
( 0.530 %) 
225,672 
( 0.614 %) 
222,496 
( 0.606 %) 
1939 257,874 
( 0.622 %) 
382,282 
( 0.922 %) 
429,120 
( 1.035 %) 
Source: Financial Report of the Hong Kong Government (various years 1934 to 1939) 
 
 
 
 
 41
Table 2: Details of land title documents for depots and repair yards granted to KMB, CMB 
and HYF 1950 to 1971 
 
a) Buses 
Year of 
Grant 
(execution 
date) 
Grantee 
(KMB/ 
CMB) 
Lot 
Number 
Site 
Area 
(sq. ft) 
Lease 
Term 
Land Use 
Restrictions 
Purchase 
Price i.e., 
Premium 
 
[PTG?] 
Crown 
Rent 
(per 
annum)
1950 CMB Inland Lot 
No. 5532 
63,400 75 years 
(renewable) 
from 03/07/ 
1939 
Offensive 
trades excluded
$0.0634M 
[No] 
[Uncertain 
but no non 
assignment 
clause] 
$1,164
1953 KMB KIL 6393RP 
94 To Kwa 
Wan Road 
(Currently 
Merit 
Industrial 
Centre) 
59,660 75 years 
renewable 
for 75 
years from 
05/10/1953
Industrial 
purpose only 
$67M 
 
 
 
[No] 
$2,192
1961 KMB KTIL 240 
98 How 
Ming St 
95,830 21 years 
renewable 
for 15 
years from 
01/07/1961
Industrial 
purposes  
except 
offensive 
noxious 
noisome/ 
unhealthy 
business or 
manufacture 
$3.623M 
[No] 
 
[Unlikely 
and no non 
assignment 
clause]  
$55,000
1962 CMB Inland Lot 
No. 7178 
Kings’ Road 
(Currently 
part of the 
Island Place) 
36,374 75 years 
(renewable) 
from 
24/05/1954
(a) Industrial 
purposes and 
(b) non-
offensive trade 
only 
0.811M 
[No] 
 
[Unlikely 
and no non 
assignment 
clause] 
$1,670
1966 KMB KTIL 192 
81 How 
Ming St 
(Currently 
under re-
construction) 
102,000 21 years 
renewable 
for 16 
years from  
01/07/1960
Industrial 
purpose only 
$3.71M 
 
[No] 
$61,500
1969 CMB Aberdeen 
Inland Lot 
No. 338 
(Wong Chuk 
Hang) 
13,000 75 years 
(renewable) 
from  
13/10/ 
1969 
 
Industrial 
and/or godown 
purposes 
excluding 
offensive 
trades 
$0.65M 
 
[No] 
$298 
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1969 CMB Inland Lot 
No. 7550 
625 King's 
Rd 
(Currently a 
commercial 
building) 
20,000 75 years 
(renewable) 
from 
14/07/1958
Before 
Modification 
(a) Industrial 
purposes or 
(b) 
Mechanical 
transport 
service 
station 
and/or petrol 
filling 
station 
and/or 
garage with 
showroom 
and/or 
offices 
ancillary; 
and 
(c) Non-
offensive 
trade 
After 
Modification 
(a) Non-
industrial 
(excl. 
residential, 
hotel, 
service 
apartment, 
petrol filling 
station & 
godown); 
(b) GFA not 
less than 
179,759 sf 
(16,700 sm); 
and 
(c) Building 
height 
restricted in 
the Hong 
Kong 
Airport 
(Control of 
Obstructions
) 
$430.23M 
 
[No] 
$1,838
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(Consolidati
on) Order 
1970 CMB Aberdeen 
Inland Lot 
No. 339 
(Wong Chuk 
Hang) 
12,500 75 years 
(renewable) 
from  
25/05/1970
Industrial 
and/or godown 
purposes 
excluding 
offensive 
trades 
$0.62M 
 
[No] 
$286 
b) HYF 
Year of 
grant 
(purchase) 
 
Lot 
number 
Site 
Area (sq. 
ft) 
Lease term Land Use 
Restrictions
Purchase 
price 
(Premium) 
 
[PTG?] 
Crown rent 
(per annum) 
1969 
 
KML 42 
(Tai Kok 
Tsui)  
 
43,235 75 years 
from 
01/01/1900 
Industrial 
purpose 
only and no 
offensive 
trades 
- 
 
[No, part of 
surrender and 
re-grant of all 5 
sites in this 
table] 
$1,986.00 
1968 KML 77 
(Tai Kok 
Tsui)  
18,093 75 years 
from 
01/01/1900 
Industrial 
purpose 
only and no 
offensive 
trade 
- 
 
[No, part of 
surrender and 
re-grant of all 5 
sites in this 
table] [Yes] 
$304.00 
(1950) KML 78 
(Tai Kok 
Tsui)  
8,281 75 years 
from 
01/01/1900 
No 
offensive 
trade  
$58.00 
(1950) KML 79 
(Tai Kok 
Tsui)  
9,336 75 years 
from 
01/01/1900 
No 
offensive 
trade  
$64 .00 
(1950)  KML 80 
(Tai Kok 
Tsui)  
7,627 75 years 
from 
01/01/1900 
No 
offensive 
trade  
$252,440.00 
 
[No] 
$52 .00 
 
Sources:  
Lands Registry, Hong Kong 
*Conditions of Sale, as found in Public Records Office, Hong Kong 
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Photo 1: Jordan Road HYF vehicular and passenger ferry piers and bus terminus 
Source: Information Services Department (first appearing in Hong Kong 1963)                          
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Photo 2 Ngau Tau Kok KMB bus terminus in 1970 
 
Source: Information Services Department  
